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INTRODUCTION
The STS-46 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report contains a summary of the
Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster/Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
(SRB/RSRM), and the Space Shuttle main engine (SSME) subsystem performance
during the forty-ninth flight of the Space Shuttle Program, and the twelfth
flight of the Orbiter vehicle Atlantis (OV-104). In addition to the Atlantis
vehicle, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET, designated ET-48 (LYT-41); three
SSME's, which were serial numbers 2032, 2033, and 2027 in positions 1, 2, and 3,
respectively; and two SRB's which were designated BI-052. The
lightweight/redesigned SRM's that were installed in each SRB were designated
360Y025A for the left RSRM and 360L025B for the right RSRM.
The STS-46 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report fulfills the Space Shuttle
Program requirement, as documented in NSTS 07700, Volume VIII, Appendix E, which
states that each major organizational element supporting the Program will report
the results of its hardware evaluation and mission performance plus identify all
related in-flight anomalies.
The primary objective of this flight was to successfully deploy the European
Retrievable Carrier (EURECA) payload and perform the operations of the Tethered
Satellite System-1 (TSS-1) and the Evaluation of Oxygen Interaction with
Material III/Thermal Energy Management Processes 2A-3 (EOIM-III/TEMP 2A-3). The
secondary objectives of this flight were to perform the operations of the IMAX
Cargo Bay Camera (ICBC), Consortium for Material Development in Space Complex
Autonomous Payload-II and III (CONCAP-II and CONCAP-III), Limited Duration Space
Environment Candidate Materials Exposure (LDCE), Pituitary Growth Hormone Cell
Function (PHCF), and Ultraviolet Plume Instrumentation (UVPI).
The sequence of events for the STS-46 mission is shown in Table I and the
Official Orbiter and GFE Projects Problem Tracking List is shown in Table II.
The STS-46 mission was planned as a 7 day plus 2 contingency day mission;
however, because of the 24-hour delay in the release of the EURECA satellite,
the mission was lengthened to a 8 day plus 2 contingency-day mission with
landing at Kennedy Space Center (KSC) on August 8, 1992.
In addition to summarizing subsystem performance, this report also discusses
each Orbiter, ET, SSME, SRB, and RSRM in-flight anomaly in the applicable
section of the report. Also included in the discussion is a reference to the
assigned tracking number as published on the Problem Tracking List. All times
are given in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) as well as mission elapsed time (MET).
The crew for this forty-ninth Space Shuttle mission was Loren J. Shriver, Col.,
USAF, Commander; Andrew M. Allen, Major, USAF, Pilot; Claude Nicollier, Ph.D.,
Mission Specialist 1; Marsha S. Ivins, Mission Specialist 2; Jeffrey A. Hoffman,
Ph.D, Mission Specialist 3 and Payload Commander; Franklin Chang-Diaz, Ph.D.,
Mission Specialist 4; and Franco Malerba, Ph.D., Payload Specialist 1. STS-46
was the third space flight for the Commander, Mission Specialist 3, and Mission
Specialist 4. STS-46 was the second space flight for Mission Specialist 2, and
the first space flight for the Pilot, Mission Specialist 1, and Payload
Specialist 1.
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MISSION SUMMARY
The STS-46 vehicle, which weighed 4,516,467 lb, was launched from KSC launch
complex 39B at 213:13:56:48.011 G.m.t. (9:56:48 a.m. e.d.t.) on July 31, 1992,
after a 48-second hold at T-5 minutes. The ground launch sequencer (GLS)
verified· the auxiliary power unit (APU) fuel-isolation-valve position at
T-5 minutes 25 seconds and at that time the APU 3 fuel isolation valve was still
closed. As a result, the GLS held the countdown. The valve was subsequently
opened and the countdown was resumed after the short hold. The ascent, on an
inclination of 28.45 degrees, was nominal in all respects.
Data analysis revealed a transient problem in the SSME 3 GH2 flow control valve(FCV). Between 90 and 110 seconds after lift-off, the SSME 3 gaseous hydrogen
(GH2) FCV inlet pressure exhibited erratic pressure cycles up to 60 psi abovethe baseline pressure of 3100 psia. The valve was not being commanded to cycle
at the time. Simultaneous with the pressure increases, the GH2 disconnectpressu~e dropped 20 psi, verifying that the pressure cycling was not an
erroneous measurement problem. Possible explanations are transient
contamination or uncommanded flow control valve poppet motion.
All SSME and RSRM start sequences occurred as expected and launch phase
performance was satisfactory in all respects. First stage ascent performance
was normal with SRB separation, entry, deceleration, and water impact occurring
as anticipated. Both SRB's were successfully recovered. Performance of the
SSME's, ET, and main propulsion system (MPS) was also normal, with main engine
cutoff (MECO) occurring at approximately 509.4 seconds after lift-off.
The post-ascent gaseous oxygen (G02) manifold pressure decay to 0 psi within
one minute of main propulsion system (MPS) dump termination violated an
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specification Document (OMRSD)
File IX requirement. This requirement states that the pressure decay will be
within 15 scim of the total system leakage measured during the previous ground
test. The G02 manifold pressure is designed to lock up and then decay slowlythroughout the mission, but in this case it tracked the liquid oxygen (L02)
manifold pressure. Vith the successful MPS dump and vacuum inerting of tfie
system, this problem did not impact the flight.
No orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) 1 maneuver was required. As a result of
the 224-second OMS 2 maneuver, the Orbiter was inserted in a 230.5 by 229 nmi.
circular orbit.
The remote manipulator system (RMS) checkout was performed at 213:19:45 G.m.t.
(00:05:48 MET) with no anomalies noted. The RMS supported the EURECA checkout,
overnight park, and deployment.
A number of intermittent data problems occurred with the EURECA payload and the
first opportunity for EURECA deployment was passed because of these problems.
The EURECA payload was deployed on the first opportunity after a 1-day delay
[215:07:06 G.m.t. (01:17:09 MET)]. Communications problems between the EURECA
and the Orbiter were determined to be caused by a payload incompatibility with
the Orbiter communications. On several occasions while the payload was still on
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the RMS, the ground stations successfully communicated with the payload. After
deployment, the Orbiter separated to 940 ft from the EURECA and remained at that
distance one orbit longer than planned, awaiting completion of the payload
checkout. Because of the 24-hour delay in the EURECA deployment, the Mission
Management Team (MMT) decided to lengthen the mission one day so that all other
experiment/payload objectives could be accomplished.
Following the EURECA burn to a higher-altitude orbit, the OMS 3 and OMS 4
maneuvers were performed to lower the Orbiter into a 160 nmi. circular orbit.
The 70-second OMS 3 maneuver was initiated at 216:10:54:11 G.m.t.
(02:20:57:23 MET) and resulted in a differential velocity (AV) of 119 ft/sec.
The 70-second OMS 4 maneuver was initiated 45 minutes later at 216:11:39:20
G.m.t. (02:21:42:32 MET) and resulted in a AV of 121 ft/sec.
At 216:05:24:23 G.m.t. (02:15:27:35 MET), the waste collection system (VCS) fan
separator 1 was turned on and demanded high currents on ac bus 1, a condition
that is indicative of a stalled motor. The high demand caused the fan separator
circuit breakers to open. The crew then selected fan separator 2, which
operated nominally. In an attempt to regain fan separator 1 operation, the fan
separator circuit breakers were reset and fan separator 1 was restarted at
216:06:49:06 G.m.t. (02:16:52:18 MET). The fan separator cleared temporarily,
but within one minute, stall currents were again observed. The crew was
instructed to perform an in-flight maintenance (IFH) procedure to clear fan
separator 1 by venting the system overboard through the waste water dump nozzle.
As the IFM was being performed, but prior to the dump valve being opened, fan
separator 1 cleared and began to operate properly. After approximately 6.5
hours of satisfactory operation, fan separator 1 again appeared to be flooded.
As a result, the IFH procedure to clear what was suspected to be a flooded fan
separator 1 was performed but was unsuccessful. Fan separator 1 failed to
operate following the second IFH procedure and fan separator 2 was selected for
the remainder of the mission. A review of waste tank quantity, waste liquid
pressure, and dp/dt data during the IFH procedures and other successful attempts
to clear fan separator 1 indicate that the fan separator 1 problems may be the
result of a mechanical problem and not flooding.
A revised fuel cell purge plan was developed and used during STS-46. The new
plan called for purges of all fuel cells at 24 hours MET by ground command. All
subsequent purges during the mission were to be performed on 48-hour intervals
or whenever a degradation of 0.2 volt was reached by any fuel cell. A final
fuel cell purge was to be performed 12 hours prior to the deorbit maneuver
to maximize fuel cell performance for entry. Additionally, if anyone fuel cell
required purging because of performance loss, all three fuel cells were to be
purged to maintain a common performance relationship between all fuel cells. As
a result of this new procedure for STS-46, five fuel cell purges were performed.
In each case, no voltage degradation was observed prior to or voltage gain
following the purges.
In preparation for the TSS-1 operations, two orbit-lowering maneuvers were
performed to place the Orbiter in a circular 160 nmi. orbit. The TSS-1 boom
extension was completed nominally at 217:16:13 G.m.t. (04:02:16 HET). The
attempt at 217:17:37 G.m.t. (04:03:40 HET) to separate the second umbilical (U2)
was unsuccessful. However, successful separation of the U2 umbilical was
attained at 217:20:01 G.m.t. (04:06:04 MET) concurrent with an Orbiter
translational pulse that loosened the U2 connection.
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The first attempt at satellite deployment occurred at 217:21:21 G.m.t. --,
(04:07:24 MET), but was aborted by the crew when excessive side-to-side movement
was observed. After a checkout of the reel and vernier motors, a second attempt
was made to deploy the satellite at approximately (217:22:51 G.m.t.)
(04:08:54 MET). The deployment was successful and the satellite tether unreeled
smoothl~ to a length of 179 meters (587 feet) when the TSS-1 stopped at
217:23:47 G.m.t. (04:09:50 MET). Because of possible buried winding on the
reel, the satellite was reeled in approximately 5 meters, then reeled out at a
somewhat higher rate to 256 meters (827 feet) where the satellite stopped.
Deployment activities were resumed about 1 1/2 hours later, but the satellite
stalled again after 2 minutes at a tether length of 257 meters (830 feet). At
this point, the satellite was powered down to survival levels to maintain
battery lifetime during a crew rest period. At 218:13:01 G.m.t. (04:23:04 MET),
the satellite was again reeled in to a tether length of 224 meters (733 feet)
where the tether became jammed and this prevented motion in either direction. A
plan was then developed to determine the location of the jam (believed to be in
upper or lower tether control mechanism), and then clear the jam. In light of
the multiple problems encountered in trying to deploy the tethered satellite,
the decision was made to bring the satellite back and dock when the jam was
cleared. The plan to accomplish the retrieval of the satellite was initiated at
218:19:51 G.m.t. (05:05:54 MET). The plan included retracting the boom a
distance of one panel and the crew visually checking for tether slack inside the
boom structure. The crew reported seeing no slack, which indicated that the jam
was at the upper tether control mechanism. The boom was then re-extended with
the reel brakes engaged. This action cleared the jam and allowed satellite
retrieval to begin. The satellite was successfully docked at the top of the
boom at 218:22:53 G.m.t. (05:08:56 MET). The boom was retracted and the
satellite was secured at 220:00:03 G.m.t. (05:10:06 MET).
At 218:20:13 G.m.t (05:06:16 MET), the cabin pressure was reduced to 10.4 psia
in anticipation of a possible TSS-re1ated contingency extravehicular activity
(EVA). However, the crew was successful in retrieving the satellite and the EVA
was not required. The cabin was repressurized to 14.7 psia at 219:00:54 G.m.t.
(05:10:57 MET).
The OMS 5 maneuver was performed at 219:09:39:06 G.m.t. (05:19:42:18 MET) and
had a duration of 33 seconds and a AV of 59.7 ft/sec. The OMS 6 maneuver was
performed at 219:10:23:14 G.m.t. (05:20:26:26 MET) and had a duration of
35 seconds and a AV of 64.3 ft/sec. These maneuvers resulted in a 123.8 by
123.4 nmi. circular orbit, which provided the optimum conditions for the
Evaluation of Oxygen Interaction with Materials (EOIM) experiment as well as for
landing on the first opportunity on flight day 8 at KSC.
The flight control system (FCS) checkout was performed at 220:10:13:00 G.m.t.
(06:20:16:12 MET) using APU 2. The APU ran for 4 minutes 52 seconds and all
systems were nominal.
During the FCS checkout, a temperature difference of approximately 4.5 0 C
existed between the two temperatures on the left air data probe while in OPS 8.
Postflight troubleshooting will be performed to determine whether the problem
involves one of the analog/digital converters or one of the temperature
transducer circuits.
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The reaction control subsystem (RCS) hot-fire was performed at 220:11:00 G.m.t.
(06:21:03 MET) and all thrusters operated satisfactorily.
Because of potentially unsatisfactory weather at KSC, the Orbiter was waved off
for the first landing opportunity. Yeather conditions improved and the decision
was made to land at KSC on the second opportunity on flight day 8.
Both payload bay (PLB) doors were closed by 221:09:35:51 G.m.t.
(07:19:39:03 MET). The deorbit maneuver was performed at 221:12:17:09 G.m.t.
(07:22:20:21 MET). The maneuver was approximately 123 seconds in duration and
the tN was 224 ft/sec. Entry interface occurred at 221:12:39:53 G.m.t.
(07:22:43:05 MET).
Main landing gear touchdown occurred at KSC on concrete runway 33 at
221:13:11:50.3 G.m.t. (07:23:15:03 MET). Nose landing gear touchdown occurred
15 seconds later with wheels stop at 221:13:12:54 G.m.t. (07:23:16:06 MET)
(August 8, 1992). The rollout was normal in all respects. The flight duration
was 7 days 23 hours 15 minutes 02 seconds. The Orbiter weight at landing was
209,882 lb. The crew completed the required postflight reconfigurations and
exited the Orbiter landing area approximately 1.5 hours after landing.
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER/REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
All SRB systems performed as expected throughout ascent. RSRM propulsion
performance was well within the required specification limits, and the
propellant burn rate for each RSRM was normal. RSRM thrust differentials during
the buildup, steady-state, and tailoff phases were well within specifications.
All SRB thrust vector control prelaunch conditions and flight performance
requirements were met with ample margins. All electrical functions performed
properly. The SRB prelaunch countdown was normal, and no SRB or RSRM in-flight
anomalies have been identified.
NO'SRB or RSRM Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) violations occurred; however, one
Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document (OMRSD)
violation occurred. During the Orbiter fuel cell activation, the voltage at SRB
bus A went to 32.68 Vdc for approximately 30 msec. The OMRSD File II
requirement specifies that the voltage be a maximum of 32 Vdc. A waiver was
processed to accept the condition based on circuit analysis which verified that
36.7 Vdc would not compromise the integrity of the integrated electronics
assembly (lEA), excluding the multiplexer/demultiplexer (MDM). The MDM circuits
were verified to be acceptable for flight by the successful completion of the
MDM countdown verification test. An OMRSD change is being made to allow a
maximum voltage spike of 36.7 Vdc for 200 msec.
Power up and operation of all case, igniter, and field joint heaters were
accomplished routinely. All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable
limits throughout the countdown. For this flight, the heated ground purge in
the SRB aft skirt was not required to maintain the case/nozzle joint and
flexible bearing temperatures within the required LCC ranges; however, it was
activated at T-15 minutes to inert the aft skirt area of hydrazine.
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The SRB flight structural temperature response was as expected. Postflight
inspection of the recovered hardware indicated that the SRB thermal protection
system (TPS) performed properly during ascent with very little TPS acreage
ablation. Separation subsystem performance was normal with all booster
separation motors (BSM's) expended and all separation bolts severed properly.
Nose cap jettison, frustum separation and nozzle jettison occurred normally on
each SRB.
The flight performance of both RSRM's was well within the allowable envelopes
and was typical of the performance observed on previous flights. The following
table provides the key RSRM parameters from the STS-46 mission.
RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE
Parameter
Impulse ga6es1-20, 106 lbf-sec1-60, 106 lbf-secI-AT, 10 lbf-sec
Vacuum Isp, Ibf-sec/lbma
Burn rate, in/sec @60 of
at 625 psia
Event times, secondsa
Ignition interval
Veb timea
Separation cue, 50 psia
Action timea
PMBT, of
Maximum ignition rise rate,
psia/10 ms
Decay t~me, seconds
(59.4 psia to 85 K)
Left motor, 81°F Rig:ht motor, 81°F
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
65.97 65.74 66.03 65.61
175.67 175.77 175.83 174.69
296.60 297.28 296.86 295.76
268.6 269.2 268.6 267.6
0.3674 0.3661 0.3673 0.3662
0.232 N/A 0.232 N/A
109.1 109.4 109.1 109.4
118.8 119.4 118.8 120.0
120.9 121.9 120.9 122.1
81.0 81.0 81.0 81.0
90.4 N/A 90.4 N/A
2.8 3.3 2.8 2.9
Tailoff imbalance
Impulse differential,
klbf-sec
Predicted
N/A
Actualb467.0
Notes:
a All times are referenced to ignition command time except where noted by
the letter a. These items are referenced to lift-off time (Ignition
interval).
b Impulse imbalance is equal to left motor minus right motor, and was
calculated by HSFC.
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Both SRB's were successfully separated from the ET at lift-off plus
125.0 seconds. The entry and deceleration sequences were properly performed on
both SRB's. RSRM nozzle jettison occurred after frustum separation, and the
subsequent parachute deployments were successfully performed. Both SRB's were
observed during descent, retrieved after impact, and brought by retrieval ship
to Cape Canaveral. The SRB's were brought to KSC where disassembly and
refurbishment activities were initiated.
EXTERNAL TANK
All objectives and requirements associated with ET propellant loading and flight
operations were met. All electrical equipment and instrumentation performed
satisfactorily; however, the liquid hydrogen (LH2) transducer 3 experienced
several stiction-type dropouts during the period of the T-9 minute hold.
Readings returned to normal, and the transducer performed as expected during LH2pressurization and flight. Also, an interim problem report (IPR) was written
against the secondary pressure transducer on the intertank purge pressure
upstream of the heater. All ET purge and heater operations were monitored and
all performed properly. No LCC or OMRSD violations were identified.
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As expected, only the normal ice/frost formations for the July atmospheric
environment were observed during the countdown. There was no frost or ice on
the acreage areas of the ET. Normal quantities of ice or frost were present on
the L02 and LH2 feedlines and on the pressurization brackets. A small amount offrost was also present along the edge of the LH2 protuberance air load (PAL)
ramps. All of these observations were acceptable and in accordance with
NSTS-08303. The Ice/Frost Red Team reported that there were no anomalous
thermal protection system (TPS) conditions except for a crack in the foam near
the base of the vertical strut similar to those conditions observed on two
previous flights.
ET flight performance was excellent. The ET pressurization system functioned
properly throughout engine start and flight. The minimum L02 ullage pressure
experienced during the period of ullage pressure slump was 13.7 psid.
ET separation was confirmed to have occurred properly, and based on main engine
cutoff (MECO) time, ET entry and breakup occurred within the predicted
footprint. Review and analysis of the ET data revealed no anomalous conditions.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
All SSME parameters appeared to be normal throughout the prelaunch countdown and
were typical of prelaunch parameters observed on previous flights. Engine ready
was achieved at the proper time, all LCC were met, and engine start and thrust
buildup were normal.
Also, at T-10 seconds, the 88ME 1 burn igniter A burn time was 1.3 seconds
instead of the nominal 8 to 12 seconds. This shortened burn time could result
in potential engine nozzle damage and could impact engine shelf life. As a
result, this condition will be evaluated to determine the cause of the shortened
burn time.
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Preliminary flight data indicate that SSME performance during mainstage,
throttling, shutdown, and propellant dump operations was normal. High pressure
oxidizer turbopump (HPOTP) and high pressure fuel turbopump (HPFTP) temperatures
appeared to be well within specification throughout engine operation. No
in-flight anomalies or significant SSME problems have been identified. A
quick-look determination of vehicle performance was made using vehicle
acceleration and preflight propulsion prediction data. These data showed that
the average flight-derived engine specific impulse (Isp) determined for the time
period between SRB separation and the start of 3g throttling was 452.3 seconds
as compared to the average tag value of 452.47 seconds.
The SSME controllers provided the proper control of the engines throughout
powered flight. Engine dynamic data overall compares well with previous flight
and test data. All on-orbit activities associated with the SSME's were
accomplished successfully.
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
The Shuttle range safety system (SRSS) closed-loop prelaunch testing was
completed as scheduled during the launch countdown. All SRSS safe and arm (S&A)
devices were armed and system inhibits turned off at the appropriate times. All
SRSS measurements including the signal strength indicated that the system
performance was as expected throughout the flight with system signal strength
well within system requirements throughout powered flight.
Prior to SRB separation, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and SRB power was
turned off, as planned. The ET system remained active until ET separation from
the Orbiter.
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the MPS was excellent. Liquid oxygen and liquid
hydrogen loading was performed with no stop-flows or reverts. Cryogenic
droplets and larger-than-normal ice buildup around the LH2 umbilical were notedduring the countdown. An unusually high humidity level existed during the
countdown, and the conditions were not a constraint to launch. There were no
LCC or OHRSD violations.
Throughout the preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas concentrations
were detected, and the maximum hydrogen level in the Orbiter aft compartment was
150 ppm, which compares very well with previous data for this vehicle. The MPS
helium system performed satisfactorily. The aft compartment helium
concentration peaked at 9500 ppm, and the aft compartment oxygen concentration
peaked at 177 ppm.
A comparison of the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish versus
the inventory load results in a loading accuracy of +0.021 percent for liquid
hydrogen and -0.008 percent for liquid oxygen.
Ascent MPS performance was acceptable. The gaseous oxygen (G02) pressurization
system performed nominally throughout the entire flight. The G02 flow control
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valves (FCV's) were shimmed to a 77.Z-percent flow area for OV-104. The minimum
liquid oxygen ullage pressure experienced during the period of ullage pressure
slump was 13.7 psid.
Data indicate that the LOZ and LHZ pressurization systems performed as planned,and that all net positive suction pressure (NP5P) requirements were met
throughout the flight; however, two pressure anomalies were noted. Space
Shuttle main engine cutoff (MECO) occurred 509.36 seconds after lift-off.
Data analysis revealed a transient problem in the 55ME 3 GH2 flow control valve(Flight Problem 5T5-46-V-01). Between 90 and 110 seconds after lift-off, the
S5ME 3 GHZ FCV inlet pressure exhibited erratic pressure fluctuations up to60 psi above the baseline pressure of 3100 psia. The valve was not being
commanded to cycle at the time. Simultaneous with the pressure increases, the
GH2 disconnect pressure dropped ZO psi below the normal operating range of300 psi, verifying that the pressure cycling was not an erroneous measurement
problem. This erratic FCV 3 pressure did not affect the LHZ tank pressure (tank
structural and SSME NPSP requirements were met within margin).
Postflight, no leaks were detected on the runway and an x-ray of FCV 3 was not
definitive. The valve poppet/sleeve assembly was removed and visually inspected
with no anomalous wear or contamination noted. Boroscope inspections of the
inlet and outlet flow control valve lines revealed no anomalous conditions or
contamination. FCV 3 was rinse sampled and the preliminary results showed no
evidence of orifice blockage by major contamination. There were many small (10
to 15 micron metallic particles with the largest being 400 microns. The poppet
flange and sleeve conical seat were evaluated for witness marks with some small
marks found in the direction of the flow; however, the pattern will be compared
with a new poppet before any conclusions will be drawn.
Continued inspection of the FCV 3 piece parts revealed that the poppet springs
were intact and there was no structural damage of any piece parts. Significant
wear was noted on the poppet seal and sleeve; however, no scenario has been
identified that would relate this wear to a pressure anomaly. Investigation
into the cause of this anomaly is continuing as this report is written.
The post-ascent GOZ manifold pressure decay to 0 psi within one minute of MPSdump termination vlolated an OMRSD File IX requirement. The manifold pressure
likewise did not respond to the repressurization during entry. The File IX
requirement states that the pressure decay will be within 15 scim of the total
system leakage measured during the previous ground test. The GOZ manifoldpressure is designed to lock up and then decay slowly throughout the mission,
but in this case it tracked the liquid oxygen manifold pressure (Flight Problem
STS-46-V-05). Vith the successful MPS dump and vacuum inerting of the system,
this problem did not impact the flight. Postflight leak checks revealed the
reverse seat leakage on the S5ME 3 isolation check valve was 176 scim, and the
maximum allowable is 100 scim.
Ullage pressures were maintained within the required limits throughout the
flight. Feed system performance was nominal. Liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen
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propellant conditions were within specified limits during all phases of
operation. Propellant dump and vacuum inerting were accomplished
satisfactorily.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The RCS performed nominally throughout the mission. In addition to the normal
attitude control activities, the RCS aft thrusters were used to perform
programmed test inputs (PTI's) in support of development test objective (DTO)
251 during entry. The RCS was interconnected to the OMS for three different
periods of time. During the period of interconnection to the left OMS
(41.1 hours), 4.91 percent of the OMS propellant was used. During the first
period of interconnection to the right OMS (33.4 hours), 3.78 percent of the OMS
propellant was used. During a second period of interconnection to the right OMS
(5.3 hours) 0.46 percent of OMS fuel was used. In addition to the OMS
propellants used during interconnect operations, a total of 5328.4 lb of
propellants was consumed by the RCS during the mission.
The RCS was used for a separation burn following the EURECA deployment, and the
RCS was also used extensively during the Tethered Satellite System operations.
During the postlanding redundant circuit verification switch test, the left
manifold 5 isolation valve indication remained open when the switch was cycled
to command the valve closed (Flight Problem STS-46-V-l1). The circuit breaker
was verified to be closed. The crew cycled the valve three times and no change
in the indication was noted. During OMS/RCS safing after KSC personnel received
control of the Orbiter, the valve was cycled and all operations were nominal.
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
The OMS subsystem operated nominally in the performance of six maneuvers. All
six maneuvers were dual engine firings and the cumulative firing time on the
OMS was 557.1 seconds. Gaging system performance was nominal on the left and
right oxidizer systems and the right fuel system. The left OMS fuel total
quantity was biased high and this condition has been observed on previous
flights of this pod. Also, the right total quantity anomaly that has been
observed on previous flights was noted on this flight. Propellant usage during
RCS interconnect operations was 4.91 percent (635.8 Ibm) while using the left
OMS, and 4.24 percent (549.1 Ibm) while using the right OMS. Total OMS
propellant usage during the mission was 14,231 lb of oxidizer and 8518 lb of
fuel.
A right OMS GN pressure isolation valve open indication was received at
217:03:52 G.m.t. (03:13:55 MET) and remained on (Flight Problem STS-46-V-09).
Data review indicates that no valve-open commands were given. The crew verified
that the crew compartment switch had not been moved and was in the off position.
In addition, if one of the coils was actually energized (to open the valve), the
heat from the coil would be expected to increase the GN2 tank pressure. The GN2pressure data showed no increase since the time the open indication was
received. About 9 hours later, the isolation valve switch was cycled and the
indication returned to normal, showing closed for the closed valve.
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Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The power reactant storage and distribution (PRSD) subsystem performed nominally
throughout the mission. The vehicle was flown with the four-tank-set
configuration. A total of 258.7 Ib of hydrogen and 2054 lb of oxygen was
supplied. In addition, 118 lb of oxygen was supplied for crew breathing. The
mission electrical capability remaining at landing would have supported an
additional 67.3 hours of flight at the 15.6-kV level.
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
The performance of the fuel cell powerplant subsystem was excellent. throughout
the mission. During the 191.3-hour mission, the fuel cells produced 2987 kVh of
electrical energy at an average power level of 15.6 kV. In addition, the fuel
cells produced 2312.8 lb of water while using 258.7 lb of hydrogen and 2054 Ib
of oxygen. The average total Orbiter electrical power load was 510 amperes.
A revised fuel cell purge plan was developed for STS-46 and subsequent flights
based on the successful results obtained during the STS-50 mission when one of
the fuel cells was not purged for over 240 hours and resulted in minimal voltage
degradation. The new plan called for purges of all fuel cells at 24 hours HET
by ground command. All subsequent purges were to be performed on 48-hour
intervals or whenever a degradation of 0.2 volt was reached by any fuel cell.
The final fuel cell purge was to be performed 12 hours prior to the deorbit
maneuver to maximize fuel cell performance for entry. Additionally, if anyone
fuel cell required purging because of performance loss, all three fuel cells
were to be purged to maintain a common performance relationship between all fuel
cells. This procedure was followed for STS-46 and resulted in a total of five
fuel cell purges with no anomalies noted. In each case, there was no observed
voltage degradation prior to or voltage gain following the purges.
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem
The APU subsystem performance during the flight was satisfactory, with three
problems noted. The three pro~lems are discussed in the following paragraphs.
During ascent and FCS checkout, the APU 2 gearbox GN2 pressure and lubrication
oil outlet pressure showed erratic traces, and during entry, two
repressurizations of the APU 2 gearbox occurred. Three minutes after APU start,
when the GN2 pressure dropped to 5.5 psia, the first repressurization occurred
and was followed by increased GN2 pressure and lubrication oil pressure.However, over the next 30 minutes, the pressures slowly decreased and the second
repressurization occurred. During entry operations, no effects were observed on
the lubrication oil or bearing temperatures; however, the lubrication oil outlet
pressure violated the lower fault detection annunciation (FDA) limit of 25 psia
just prior to the second APU 2 repressurization at 221:13:03 G.m.t.
(07:23:06 MET). The repressurizations were expected as they also occurred on
this APU during the previous flight of this vehicle. Data analysis will be
performed to determine the cause of this condition; however, leakage of GN2 andlubrication oil past the turbine shaft seal is suspected. An in-flight anomaly
was assigned to this APU on the previous flight for this same condition.
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The APU 1 seal cavity drain pressure decayed from 16 psi to 10 psi over a
3D-minute period after APU start during entry. It is suspected that the seal
cavity relieved into the APU gearbox. Postflight analysis will be performed to
determine the cause of the leak; however, leakage into the gearbox because of a
faulty gearbox seal is the suspected cause of the failure. This same condition
was noted on the previous flight of this APU and consequently, the reappearance
of the condition was not unexpected. This APU (serial no. 312) will be replaced
with an improved APU during the Orbiter maintenance down period (OHDP).
Fuel consumption and run time on each APU is provided in the following table.
APU 1 (S/N 312) IAPU 2 (S/N 407) APU 3 (S/N 307)
Flight Phase Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel
min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption,
lb lb Ib
Ascent 20:18 49 20:18 47 20:18 53
FCS checkout 04:52 12
Entry! 73:45 137 56:14 111 56:14 126
Totala 94:03 186 81:24 170 76:32 179
~he APU's were operated for approximately 15 minutes after landing.
Hydraulics/Vater Spray Boiler Subsystem
The performance of the hydraulics/water spray boiler (VSB) subsystem was nominal
throughout the flight. The VSB 2 ready indication was lost twice, as expected,
prior to APU start because the vent temperature dropped below 130 of. This
condition has been seen on many previous flights, and is now acceptable for APU
start.
The VSB 2 GN2 relief valve failed the in-flight checkout requirement of 30.0 to33.5 psig by cracking at an indicated pressure of 36.2 psig. This same data
signature was noted on STS-44 and STS-45, and the condition is believed to
result from an intermittent pressure transducer as indicated by a delayed
response followed by an instantaneous pressure drop of 5 psi during the time
frame of cracking. Replacement of this transducer is scheduled to occur during
the OHDP.
APU 2 was operated for the FCS checkout, and the hydraulics/water spray boiler
subsystem performed satisfactorily. APU run time for the checkout was 4 minutes
52 seconds with no hydraulic or lubrication oil cooling required.
Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem
The performance of the electrical power distribution and control (EPD&C)
subsystem was nominal throughout the mission. All data analyzed showed nominal
voltage and current signatures, and no specified limits were violated. All File
IX requirements were satisfied. No discrepancies were noted during the flight.
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Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem
The performance of the atmospheric revitalization system (ARS) was nominal in
all respects. The CO2 partial pressure was maintained below 6.05 mm Hg. Cabin
air temperature and relative humidity peaked at 85.5°F and 67.5 percent,
respectively. Avionics bays 1, 2, and 3 air outlet temperatures peaked at
105.5°F, 10goF, and 85.2°F, respectively, and the water coldplate temperatures
for these three avionics bays peaked at 92.0 oF, 92.0 oF, and
85.2°F, respectively. All in-flight requirements were met during the successful
redundant components check.
The atmospheric revitalization pressure control system performed normally
throughout the mission. During the redundant component check, the alternate
system was selected and operated properly. The cabin was depressurized to
10.2 psia at 218:20:13 G.m.t. (05:06:16 MET) to support an unscheduled payload
contingency EVA that was not performed. The cabin was repressurized to
14.7 psia at 219:00:54 G.m.t. (05:10:57 MET).
The active thermal control system (ATCS) performance was nominal throughout the
STS-46 flight. The ATCS flawlessly provided the required cooling to the TSS
payload during powered payload operations. The flash evaporator system (FES)
was used to perform several water dumps and performed nominally. The radiator
coldsoak provided cooling during entry through touchdown plus 12 minutes, after
which ammonia systems B and A provided cooling until ground support equipment
(GSE) hookup at landing plus 56 minutes.
The supply water and waste management systems performed nominally throughout the
mission. At the completion of the mission, all of the associated supply water
in-flight requirements had been performed and satisfied.
Supply water was managed through the use of the FES and the overboard dump
system. The supply water dump line temperature was maintained between 66 and
89°F throughout the mission with the operation of the line heaters.
Vaste water was gathered at about the predicted rate. Three waste water dumps
were performed at an average rate of 1.93 percent/minute (3.18 lb/min). The
waste water dump line temperature was maintained between 57 and 74°F throughout
the mission, while the vacuum vent line temperature was between 58 and 76°F.
Two dumps were performed with the water and waste tanks depressurized to cabin
pressure (14.7 psia) in support of DTO 0325 - Yaste/Supply Yater Dumps. Supply
water was dumped at a rate of 0.94 percent/minute (1.55 lb/min), while waste
water was dumped at 1.49 percent/minute (2.4 lb/min). Views of the nozzles
using an RMS TV camera depicted a normal supply water dump, while evidence of
"popcorn" flakes were seen during the waste water dump; however, no icing of the
nozzles was observed. This flake condition is the result of gas in the waste
water and was expected for the reduced-pressure dump.
The VCS performed adequately throughout the mission. A cabin air leak through
the VCS resulted in high pressure control system oxygen flow alarms. Uplinked
diagnostic procedures performed by the crew indicated that debris beneath the
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slide valve assembly was interfering with the proper sealing of the slide valve.
The crew operated the commode control handle forward and back approximately
15 times to remove any debris on the slide valve. This procedure cleared the.
cabin air leak and subsequent operations of this valve were satisfactory.
At 216:05:24:23 G.m.t. (02:15:27:35 MET), the VCS fan separator 1 was turned on
and demanded high currents on ac bus 1, a condition that is indicative of a
stalled motor. The high demand caused the fan separator circuit breakers to
open. Preliminary assessment of the problem indicated that the fan separator
was flooded; similar problems were experienced on STS-26 and STS-49. In an
attempt to regain fan separator 1 operation, the fan separator circuit breakers
were reset and fan separator 1 was restarted at 216:06:49:06 G.m.t.
(02:16:52:18 MET). The fan separator cleared temporarily, but within one
minute, stall currents were again observed. The crew was instructed to perform
an IFM procedure to clear fan separator 1 by venting the system overboard
through the waste water dump nozzle. As the IFM was being performed but prior
to the dump valve being opened, fan separator 1 cleared and began to operate
properly. After approximately 6.5 hours of satisfactory operation, fan
separator 1 again appeared to be flooded. As a result, the IFM procedure that
was previously used to clear flooded fan separator 1 was performed but was
unsuccessful (Flight Problem STS-46-V-06). Fan separator 1 failed to operate
following the second IFM procedure and fan separator 2 was selected for the
remainder of the mission. A review of waste tank quantity, waste liquid
pressure, and dp/dt data during the IFM procedures and other successful attempts
to clear fan separator 1 indicate that the fan separator 1 problems were the
result of a mechanical problem and not flooding.
Fan separator 2 motor stall currents indicated that fan separator 2 flooded
during use at 218:02:29 G.m.t. (04:12:32 MET). After two unsuccessful attempts
to clear fan separator 2, the crew was instructed to operate the fan separator
motor at the stall condition continuously in an attempt to clear the flooding.
After nine minutes at the stall condition, the fan separator cleared and was
operated continuously for an additional 2 hours and 45 minutes before being
powered off. The waste water liquid line pressure response when fan separator 2
cleared verified that the problem was due to flooding. The crew returned to
nominal fan separator 2 operations following the clearing of the flooded
condition, and fan separator 2 operated satisfactorily for the remainder of the
mission. This type of flooding during use is not unexpected for the low-torque
fan separator 2 motor.
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystems
The smoke detection subsystem performance was nominal except for the avionics
bay 2A smoke detector. Between flight day 1 and 2, the A smoke detector
concentration output in aVionic~ bay 2 experienced several ~rops from a nominal
reading of approximately 0 ~g/m to approximately -750 ~g/m (Flight Problem
STS-46-V-04). Subsequently, the concentration returned to its nominal reading
and remained there for the remainder of the flight. This detector is still
considered capable of providing adequate warning in the event of a smoke
incident. Use of the fire suppression system was not required.
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Airlock Support System
The airlock support system performance was nominal. At 218:20:13 G.m.t
(05:06:16 MET), the airlock depressurization valve was used to reduce the cabin
pressure to 10.2 psia in anticipation of a possible TSS-related contingency EVA.
However, the crew was successful in retrieving the satellite and the EVA was not
required. The cabin was repressurized to 14.7 psia at 219:00:54 G.m.t.
(05:10:57 MET). Use of the rest of the airlock support components was not
required.
Avionics and Software Subsystems
The performance of the integrated guidance, navigation and control subsystem was
nominal. Likewise, the star tracker and data processing system (DPS)/flight
software performance was nominal. No displays and controls subsystem problems
were noted.
The inertial measurement units (IMU's) performed satisfactorily. A bias of
140 ~g's was observed on high accuracy inertial navigation system (BAINS) unit
203 during the flight. Normal compensations were uplinked to correct the bias.
No other significant biases were observed during the mission.
The operational instrumentation and modular auxiliary data system performance·
was nominal with two in-flight anomalies noted. The body skin temperature
measurement (V09T1026A) operated intermittently for short periods at
approximately 213:21:00 G.m.t. (00:07:03 MET) (Flight Problem STS-46-V-02a), and
operated satisfactorily for the remainder of the mission. At main landing gear
touchdown, the right main gear brake line temperature dropped off-scale low
(Flight Problem STS-46-V-2b). Although this sensor is not currently used, it
can be used as one of several temperature control sensors for activation of the
system 1 hydraulic circulation pump.
The FCS checkout was performed at 220:10:13:00 G.m.t. (06:20:16:12 HET) using
APU 2. The APU ran for 4 minutes 52 seconds and all systems were nominal. The
FCS was used in support of DTO 251 - Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test
(Alternate Elevon Schedule). However, the automatic elevon schedule was .flown
instead of the alternate (fixed) elevon schedule. This decision had been made
during preflight planning to use the automatic elevon schedule, and the decision
resulted from the problems noted during· the STS-50 alternate elevon test.
During FCS checkout, a temperature difference of approximately 4.5 0 C was noted
between the two temperatures on the left air data probe while operating in the
OPS 8 mode (Flight Problem STS-46-V-12). Temperature data from the two
transducers in the left probe are processed by air data transducer assembly
(ADTA) 1 and ADTA 3. During STS-46, these data were good during prelaunch
operations (OPS 9) as well as during the ADTA self-test performed during FCS
checkout (OPS 8). The concern is that the temperatures for a given probe are
expected to closely track each other, and therefore, this signature could
indicate a transducer or an ADTA electronics problem. Postflight
troubleshooting of this condition will be performed during turnaround activities
to determine whether the problem involves one of the analog/digital converters
or one of the temperature transducer circuits.
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Communications and Tracking Subsystem
The communications and tracking subsystem performed in an acceptable manner with
a total of four anomalies occurring during the mission.
The flight crew reported at approximately 214:12:30 G.m.t. (00:22:33 MET) that
the flight deck speaker was not operating after having operated nominally for
several hours (Flight Problem STS-46-V-03). This speaker is one of the
redesigned units that was flown for the first time on this vehicle. The circuit
breaker was cycled at least five times in an attempt to regain use of the
speaker, but the attempts were unsuccessful.
At 216:13:20 G.m.t. (02:23:23 MET), the crew reported that they could not
transmit when using channell of wireless crew communications system (WCCS)
audio interface unit C (AIU-C) (Flight Problem STS-46-V-07). However, the crew
did receive transmissions when using channell of AIU-C. Several crew remote
units (CRU's) were tried with channell, but no communications were achieved.
Other WCCS AIU channels continued to operate correctly.
On a number of occasions during the mission, the crew received the low-voltage
warning tone from the CRU's after a couple of hours of use on a fresh battery as
well as immediately after a fresh battery was installed (Flight Problem
STS-46-V-08). In some cases, the crew were able to continue using a battery for
up to 36 hours after first receiving the "low-battery" tone, although the tone
did continue throughout the period of time that that battery was used.
As a result of testing, it was confirmed that the video signals from payload bay
cameras A, B, C, D, and the RMS elbow camera caused over-modulation of Ku-Band
channel 3 (Flight Problem STS-46-V-10). This over-modulation condition resulted
in the loss of channel 2 (operations recorder dumps) and channel 1 (real-time
data) on some occasions. A test matrix was generated for evaluation of this
condition, which included a spectrum analysis. The testing produced nominal
results as the problem had cleared prior to the testing and did not repeat for
the remainder of the mission.
At 219:17:52 G.m.t. (06:03:55 MET), real-time television of the payload bay was
being downlinked via CCTV camera D. The video had a black spot in the center of
the picture that appeared to be a burn spot. The camera remained usable for the
rest of the mission as this spot only slightly degraded the video from the
camera.
The S-band data were lost for a few minutes on many orbits with losses mostly
occurring during lower-right antenna operations. The losses have been
attributed to RF interference.
Structures and Mechanical Subsystems
All mechanically actuated subsystems performed nominally including the vent
doors, ET/Orbiter umbilical doors, payload bay doors, star tracker doors,
Ku-Band antenna deployment actuator, and air data probe system. The landing and
braking data are shown in the table on the following page.
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LANDING AND BRAKING PARAMETERS
From
Parameter threshold, Speed, Sink rate, ft/sec Pitch rate,
ft keas de~/sec
Main gear touchdown 1865 197.3 -2.0 n/a
Nose gear touchdown 6521 148.1 n/a 3.68
Braking initiation speed 132.2 knots (keas)
Brake-on time 42.2 seconds
Rollout distance 10,860 feet
Rollout time 65.6 seconds
Runway 33 (concrete) at KSC
Orbiter weight at landing 209,882.2 lb
Brake sensor location Pressure, Brake assembly Energy,
psia million ft-lb
Left-hand inboard 1 876 Left-hand outboard 24.95
Left-hand inboard 3 840 Left-hand inboard 27.37
Left-hand outboard 2 840 Right-hand inboard 31.17
Left-hand outboard 4 804 Right-hand outboard 26.96
Right-hand inboard 1 1068
Right-hand inboard 3 1020
Right-hand outboard 2 972
Right-hand outboard 4 948
Tire location Pressure, Tire temperature, OF Temperature decal,
psia OF
Left-hand outboard 343.5 63.3 260
Left-hand inboard 344.8 63.3 200
Right-hand inboard 353.2 68.3 200
Right-hand outboard 353.7 68.3 200
Left-hand nose gear 343.0 68.3 N/A
Right-hand nose gear 341.6 68.3 N/A
All brakes were in satisfactory condition with clearance between the brake pucks
and the pressure plate. All the bungees fired; all the uplock hooks released;
and the nose landing gear axle nuts were in proper alignment. Some hydraulic
fluid was visible on the right-hand main landing gear strut and the nose landing
gear strut; however, this condition has been noted on previous missions and is
not indicative of a problem.
The tires looked to be in excellent condition. There was little scuffing on the
four tires with the right tires showing the least scuffing. The scuffing was
located on the first rib (from the left) on three of the main tires. The
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right-hand inboard tire had scuffing on the fourth rib. The spin-up patch on
the right-hand inboard tire looked different from that seen previously. The
nose gear tires looked good, with the right-hand nose tire having a very
discernible spin-up patch.
Aerodynamics, Heating and Thermal Interfaces
Both the ascent and entry aerodynamics were nominal. During entry, the
automatic elevon schedule was performed. During the automatic schedule, six
PTI's and one manual body flap maneuver were performed.
The ascent and entry heating were nominal and within established limits. The
preliminary postflight inspections showed no heating damage. The thermal
interfaces remained within limits throughout the countdown and mission with no
LCC violations noted.
A portable Shuttle thermal imager was used to measure the surface temperatures
of three areas on the Orbiter TPS after landing. These measurements were made
in accordance with OMRSD requirements. Twenty-two minutes after landing, the
Orbiter nose cap reinforced carbon carbon (RCC) was 194°P; the right RCC panel
17 temperature was 129°P; and the right RCC panel 9 temperature was 139°P.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The thermal control system performed satisfactorily in the maintenance and
control of the thermal environment. One anomaly was noted immediately after
ascent when the body flap lower skin temperature measurement (V09T1026A) ~-
operated erratically (Plight Problem STS-46-V-02a). Later in the mission when
data again became available from this sensor, the sensor was operating properly.
Aero thermodynamics
The acreage heating was nominal throughout entry with no excessive temperatures
noted.
Thermal Protection Subsystem
The TPS performance was nominal, based on structural temperature response and
some tile surface temperature measurements. The overall boundary layer
transition from laminar to turbulent flow was symmetric, occurring 1250 seconds
after entry interface.
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 236 hits, of which 22 had a major dimension
of one inch or greater. The total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits was higher
than average; however, the number of hits having a major dimension greater than
one inch was less than average. This total does not include the numerous hits
on the base heat shield that have been attributed to SSME vibration/acoustics
and exhaust plume recirculation. A comparison of these numbers to statistics
from 33 previous missions of similar configuration indicates that the total
number of hits is greater than average, and the number of hits one inch or
larger in diameter is average.
~"
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The Orbiter lower surface sustained a total of 186 hits, of which 11 had a major
dimension of one inch or greater. Seventy-one hits, two of which had a major
dimension of one inch or greater, were clustered aft and inboard of the LH2
ET/Orbiter (left-hand) umbilical. Similar clusters have been observed on
previous flights and are probably caused by ice and debris that is shed from the
umbilical during ascent. A tile outboard of the right-hand nose landing gear
door exhibited a pin hole with inclusion. Further assessment of the
hole/inclusion will be performed and a sample taken, if required.
Postflight inspections of reinforced carbon carbon (RCC) parts identified some
small pits in the outer surface of some panels and tee-seals-from about panel 6
to 18 on the lower surface of both wings. Similar pits were noted on STS-50.
These damage sites can be generally characterized as very small pits or pinholes
from which a glassy substance has bubbled on to the surface. The pits are
estimated to be in the range of 1 to 10 mils in diameter with an unknown depth,
but contained within the silicon carbide coating layer of the leading edge
structural system. Although it cannot be verified at this time, the cause of
the pitting condition appears to be a combination of material characteristics
and flight conditions (temperature and pressure). In addition to the pits, a
reduction in the Type A surface sealant on the lower surface was noticeable.
These conditions are not considered to be a safety-of-flight issue, but the
conditions will continue to be evaluated after the next flight of OV-104 and
OV-102.
The nose landing gear door thermal barrier had two torn patches. Numerous
tears, frays, and protrusions occurred on the sleeving of the main landing gear
door thermal barriers. These barriers are to be replaced with the redesigned,
mechanically attached thermal barriers. The redesigned, mechanically attached
ET door thermal barriers performed well and showed no signs of degradation or
subsurface flow. Degraded outer mold line repairs existed on tiles at both
elevon-elevon gap locations.
No TPS damage was attributed to material from the wheels, tires, or brakes.
All ET/Orbiter separation ordnance devices appeared to have functioned properly.
No flight hardware was found on the runway below the umbilicals when the ET
doors were opened.
Damage to the base heatshield tiles was typical. The SSME 1 dome-mounted heat
shield closeout blanket was torn at the 6 o'clock position. The blanket on
SSME 2 was frayed from the 2 o'clock to 3 O'clock position. There was no
apparent damage to the SSME 1 nozzle insulation from the hydrogen igniter
anomaly during SSME ignition.
Orbiter windows 3 and 4 exhibited moderate hazing with a few streaks. Hazing on
the other windows was less than usual. Vindow 5 sustained an impact and will be
removed and replaced. Laboratory analysis will be performed on samples taken
from windows 1 through 8 and window 11. Six damage sites were noted on the
perimeter tiles around window 3. The impact sites were only surface coating
losses or were no more than 1/4 inch deep. This damage may have been caused by
the room temperature vulcanizing (RTV) used to bond the paper covers to the
forward Res nozzles or by exhaust products from the SRB booster separation
motors.
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GOVERNMENT FURNISHED EQUIPMENT/FLIGHT CRE~ EQUIPMENT
All government furnished equipment/flight crew equipment operated nominally
throughout the mission.
REMOTE MANIPULATOR SYSTEM
The RMS accomplished its mission objectives with full system performance and
with no RMS anomalies during the total uncradled operational time of 2 days'
6 hours 43 minutes.
Prior to the EURECA deployment operations, the RMS was uncradled for 1 1/4 hours
for RMS checkout. All checkout signatures were nominal.
EURECA was scheduled for deployment with the RMS within 18 hours of launch.
Because of the payload/Orbiter communications problems, EURECA release was
delayed 24 hours from the planned release time. The RMS grappled the payload
approximately 11 1/2 hours into the mission with unberthing occurring about
1 hour later. At the lower hover position above the payload bay, the Orbiter
payload data interleaver first lost communications with the EURECA satellite.
Deployment maneuvers continued to the release position where EURECA solar arrays
and the antenna were deployed. Payload-communications troubleshooting continued
until a decision was made to park the RMS and satellite for a crew sleep period.
About 36 hours into the mission, the RMS/EURECA was returned to the release
position and the satellite was released at 215:07:07 G.m.t. (01:17:10 MET). As
planned preflight, the RMS was left in a poise-for-capture position for 6 hours
in preparation for a contingency EURECA retrieval. Rather than cradling the
RMS, the wrist camera was moved to a position to view a scientific experiment
near the TSS-1 support base until the wrist camera was needed to view the water
dump nozzle during a scheduled performance of DTO 325. The RMS was cradled at
216:07:41 G.m.t. (02:17:44 MET) after the final use of the wrist camera for
close-in viewing of the TSS in its support structure.
CARGO INTEGRATION
All integration hardware performed nominally, and no cargo integration
out-of-limit conditions were noted during the flight.
PAYLOADS
EUROPEAN RETRIEVABLE CARRIER
The EURECA encountered extensive communications problems with the Orbiter
(Atlantis), and consequently, the release of the satellite was delayed
approximately 24 hours. The EURECA was successfully released from Atlantis at
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215:07:07 G.m.t. (01:17:10 MET). After the planned 6-hour period of station
keeping with the Atlantis, the EURECA initiated the first orbital transfer
maneuver (OTM). Approximately seven minutes into the burn, it was terminated
because of attitude errors which were later determined to be invalid values in
the low attitude conical Earth sensor (LACES) calibration data table. Corrected
values were uplinked and the remaining burn time (approximately 14 minutes) was
successfully completed at 5:27 a.m. c.d.t. on August 6, 1992. The OTM-2 burn
was successfully performed at 4:26 a.m. c.d.t. on August 7, 1992, and the EURECA
was inserted in a circular orbit at an altitude of 270 nmi. At the end of the
STS-46 mission, the EURECA payloads were being activated and the satellite
systems were operating nominally.
TETHERED SATELLITE SYSTEM
As a result of the one-day delay in the deployment of the EURECA satellite,
TSS-1 operations were also delayed one day. The Orbiter performed two
orbit-lowering maneuvers to place the Orbiter in a circular 160 nmi. orbit.
The TSS-1 boom extension was nominal with completion occurring at
217:16:13 G.m.t. (04:02:16 MET). The subsequent attempt at 217:17:37 G.m.t.
(04:03:40 MET) to separate the second umbilical (U2) was unsuccessful. However,
successful separation of the U2 umbilical was attained at 217:20:01 G.m.t.
(04:06:04 MET) concurrent with an Orbiter translational pulse that loosened the
U2 connection.
The first attempt at satellite deployment occurred at 217:21:21 G.m.t.
(04:07:24 MET), but was aborted by the crew when excessive side-to-side movement
was observed. After a checkout of the reel and vernier motors, a second attempt
was made to deploy the satellite at approximately (217:22:51 G.m.t.)
(04:08:54 MET). The deployment was successful and the satellite tether unreeled
smoothly to a length of 179 meters (587 feet) when the TSS-1 stopped at
217:23:47 G.m.t. (04:09:50 MET). Because of possible buried winding on the
reel, the satellite was reeled in approximately 5 meters, then reeled out at a
somewhat higher rate to 256 meters (827 feet) where the satellite stopped.
Deployment activities were resumed about 1 1/2 hours later, but the satellite
stalled again after 2 minutes at a tether length of 257 meters (830 feet). At
this point, the satellite was powered down to survival levels to maintain
battery lifetime during a crew rest period. At 218:13:01 G.m.t. (04:23:04 MET),
the satellite was again reeled in to a tether length of 224 meters (733 feet)
where the tether became jammed which prevented motion in either direction. A
plan was then developed to determine the location of the jam (believed to be in
- upper or lower tether control mechanism), and then clear the jam. In light of
the multiple problems encountered in trying to deploy the tethered satellite,
the decision was made to bring the satellite back and dock when the jam was
cleared. The plan to accomplish the retrieval of the satellite was initiated at
218:19:51 G.m.t. (05:05:54 MET). The plan included retracting the boom a
distance of one panel and having the crew visually check for tether slack inside
the boom structure. The crew reported seeing no slack, which indicated that the
jam was at the upper tether control mechanism. The boom was then re-extended
with the reel brakes engaged. This action cleared the jam and allowed satellite
retrieval to begin. The satellite was successfully docked at the top of the
boom at 218:22:53 G.m.t. (05:08:56 MET). The boom was retracted and the
satellite was secured at 220:00:03 G.m.t. (05:10:06 MET).
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The primary data set required that the satellite be deployed a minimum distance
of 10 km. The maximum deployed distance was 257 meters, and the predicted
45 volts electromagnetic flux (EMF) and 15 rnA were developed. However, this
level of induced voltage was insufficient to excite the physical process for the
Category I or II objectives. The Category III objectives accomplished included
studies of electron beam propagation, beam-gas cloud interactions, and Shuttle
glow. More data than planned for this limited deployment were obtained for
these investigations. Also, as a result of the unplanned stops at a distance of
less than 1 km, a number of unplanned observations were made that will enhance
the understanding of electrodynamic tethers in space. Dynamic observations
included the damping of longitudinal modes, libration control via the Orbiter,
and tether string modes.
EVALUATION OF OXYGEN INTERACTION VITH MATERIALS 111/
THERMAL ENERGY MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 2A-3
After completion of the TSS-1 activi'ties, two OMS maneuvers were performed to
lower the orbital altitude of the Orbiter into a circular orbit at 124 nmi. The
Evaluation of Oxygen Interaction with Materials III (EOIM III) operated for the
full 40-hour requirement for material sample exposure to the atomic oxygen flux
at the 124-nmi. altitude. Another part of the experiment lost a portion of one
of the five 8-hour cycles due to a momentary main power outage; however, the
science loss was minimal. The TEMP 2A-3 payload operated flawlessly throughout
the mission and obtained 126 percent of the planned data takes.
lMAX CARGO BAY CAMERA
The lMAX Cargo Bay Camera (ICBC) successfully exposed all 10 minutes 25 seconds
of film. The ICBC completed nine flight-unique scenes which included EURECA
prerelease and postrelease, TSS-1 flyaway, and TSS reeling out and reeling in.
Additionally, nine Earth observation scenes were captured on film including
typhoon Janis, the Vindward Islands, Java, the Sahara Desert, Madagascar,
Brazil, the Andes mountains, Tuamoto Archipelago, and Indonesia through
Australia.
CONSORTIUM FOR MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SPACE COMPLEX AUTONOMOUS PAYLOAD-II
The Consortium for Material Development in Space Complex Autonomous Payload-II
(CONCAP-II) successfully operated on flight days 7 and 8. Early in the cycle,
some uncertainty about the status of the motorized door assembly existed;
however, this was resolved and 10 hours of data were gathered (100 percent of
their requirement).
CONSORTIUM FOR MATERIAL DEVELOPMENT IN SPACE COMPLEX AUTONOMOUS PAYLOAD-III
The Consortium for Material Development in Space Complex Autonomous Payload-III
(CONCAP-III) acceleration measurement system operated nominally throughout the
flight. The second objective of this payload could only be met with the TSS
satellite deployed to a significantly greater distance than the satellite was
able to attain. Therefore, this second objective was not met.
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LIMITED DURATION SPACE ENVIRONMENT CANDIDATE MATERIAL EXPOSURE
The Limited Duration Space Environment Candidate Material Exposure (LDCE)
operated nominally and the entire 40-hour material samples exposure time was
obtained.
PITUITARY GROWTH HORMONE CELL FUNCTION
The Pituitary Growth Hormone Cell Function (PHCF) payload required a prelaunch
change of the experiment sample because of bacterial contamination. Temperature
ranges were adjusted early in the flight and total science recovery was
anticipated. The PHCF payload experienced no anomalies during the flight.
ULTRAVIOLET PLUME INSTRUMENT
There were no opportunities for Ultraviolet Plume Instrument (UVPI) observations
during this flight.
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES AND DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
A total of eight DTO's and 10 detailed supplementary objectives (DSO's) were
assigned to the STS-46 flight. Of these, six DTO's and all 10 DSO's were
accomplished. A discussion of each DTO and DSO is contained in the following
paragraphs.
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
In addition to the six DTO's that were accomplished, the crew provided two
photographs of the ET after separation. These photographs are normally
scheduled under DTO 312; however, this DTO was not scheduled for STS-46. The
photographs were very good and the unexpected data will be analyzed.
The status of the assigned DTO's is contained in the following paragraphs.
DTO 251 - Entry Aerodynamic Control Surfaces Test - This DTO was to be performed
using an alternate (fixed) elevon schedule; however, this use of this schedule
was canceled because of problems encountered on STS-50. As a result, this DTO
was accomplished using the automatic elevon schedule.
DTO 307D - Entry Structural Capability - Data were gathered for this DTO during
entry. The data have been given to the sponsor for analysis.
DTO 325 - Vaste/Supply Vater Dumps - Two dumps were performed with the supply
water and waste tanks depressurized to cabin pressure (14.7 psia) in support of
test 3 of this DTO. Supply water was dumped at a rate of 0.94 percent/minute
(1.55 lb/min), while waste water was dumped at 1.49 percent/minute (2.4 lb/min).
Views of the nozzles using an RMS TV camera depicted a normal supply water dump,
while evidence of "popcorn" flakes were seen during the waste water dump;
however, no icing of the nozzles was observed. This flake condition is the
result of gas in the waste water and was expected for the reduced-pressure dump.
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DTO 656 - Payload and General Purpose Computer Single Event Upset Monitoring -
The Payload and General Support Computer (PGSC) Single Event Upset Monitoring
DTO was conducted on flight days 1, 2, and 3. The data have been given to the
sponsor for evaluation.
DTO 663 - Acoustical Noise Dosimeter - Data were gathered on flight days 1, 2,
4, 6, and 7 and all runs were complete except for flight day 1. The data have
been given to the sponsor for evaluation.
DTO 666 - Modify ECLSS Supply Air Ducting to Provide Chilled Air to Suited Crew
Members - This DTO was performed; however, the crew indicated that without
proper venting from the suit, this modification does not relieve the conditions
for which it was developed.
DTO 700-2 - Laser Range and Range Rate Device - The laser range and range rate
device was used during TSS-1 deployment operations with no apparent anomalies.
The sponsor has received the data for evaluation.
DTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - The crosswind landing performance DTO
was a DTO of opportunity for Edwards Air Force Base; however, the landing was at
Kennedy Space Center and the DTO was not performed.
DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DSO 484 - Assessment of Circadian Shifting in Astronauts by Bright Lights - This
DSO was a preflight and postflight testing DSO with no in-flight test
requirements. The DSO was completed and the results have been given to the ,-~,
sponsor for evaluation.
DSO 603 - Orthostatic Function During Entry, Landing, and Egress - This DSO,
using the 603 B protocol, was performed during deorbit preparations, entry,
landing, and egress from the Orbiter. The data have been given to the sponsor
for evaluation.
DSO 604 - Visual Vestibular Integration as a Function of Adaption - This DSO was
performed on flight day 2, and the data have been given to the experiment
sponsor for evaluation.
DSO 613 - Changes in Endocrine Regulation of Orthostatic Tolerance Following
Space Flight - This DSO was performed during preflight and postflight operations
and had no in-flight requirements. The data are being evaluated by the sponsor.
DSO 614 - Effect of Prolonged Space Flight on Head and Gaze Stability During
Locomotion - This DSO was performed during preflight and postflight operations
and had no in-flight requirements. The data are being evaluated by the sponsor.
DSO 618 - Effects of Intense Exercise During Space Flight on Aerobic Capacity
and Orthostatic Function - This DSO was performed on flight days 1, 3, and 7.
This DSO was flown with two subjects: one active and one control. Data have
been given to the sponsor for evaluation.
DSO 802 - Educational Activities (Objective 1) - This DSO was completed on
flight day 2. The data are being used to prepare videos for educational use.
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DSO 901 - Documentary Television - This DSO was accomplished throughout the
flight as videos were made of various activities. The videos have been given to
the sponsor for evaluation.
DSO 902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - This DSO was accomplished
throughout the flight as motion pictures were taken of various activities. The
film is being evaluated by the sponsor.
DSO 903 - Documentary Still Photography - This DSO was accomplished at the crew
discretion throughout the mission. The film is being evaluated by the sponsor.
PHOTOGRAPHIC AND TELEVISION ANALYSES
LAUNCH DATA ANALYSIS
On launch day, 22 of the 23 expected videos were received and screened. Items
of interest included observation of a bolt hang-up on holddown post H-7 on the
left SRB. Camera E-11 showed the condition with the visible extent of the bolt
hang up measured at 13.11 inches when the bolt appeared to be at maximum
extension.
A second item was the discolorations noted in the SSME 1 and 2 Mach diamonds
both before lift-off and after the roll maneuver. This condition is under
review by both JSC and MSFC personnel.
The final item noted was the appearance of possible excessive vibration of the
SSME 2 engine bell at engine start-up. An engineering review is underway to
determine if the motion observed was excessive.
ON-ORBIT DATA ANALYSIS
On-orbit photographic data analysis has consisted of evaluating the two
photographs of the ET after separation, and the videos of the satellite
operations. The DTO (312) that requires photographs of the ET was not planned
for this mission; however, Mission Specialist 3 provided a bonus to the DTO
sponsor by taking two photographs. The photographs were taken about 21 minutes
after lift-off, and as a result, the ET image is much smaller than observed
previously. Photographic enhancement techniques were used in an effort to
obtain additional information from the photographs.
LANDING DATA ANALYSIS
Nine landing videos were made and received three hours after landing for
evaluation. No anomalous events were detected on any of the landing videos.
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TABLE 1.- STS-46 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Event
APU activation
SRB BPU activation
Main propulsion
System start
SRB ignition command
(lift-off)
Throttle up to
104 percent thrust
Throttle down to
82 percent thrust
Maximum dynamic
pressure (q)
Throttle down to
67 percent thrust
Throttle up to
104 percent thrust
Both SRH's chamber
pressure at 50 psi
End SRH action
SRB separation command
SRB physical
separation
Throttle down for
3g acceleration
3g acceleration
MECO
Engine Shutdown
ET separation
Description
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
L8 BPU system A start command
L8 8PU system B start command
RH 8PU system A start command
RH BPU system B start command
Engine 3 start command accepted
Engine 2 start command accepted
Engine 1 start command accepted
SRB ignition command to SRB
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Derived ascent dynamic
pressure
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
RH SRH chamber pressure
mid-range select
18 SRH chamber pressure
mid-range select
RH SRH chamber pressure
mid-range select
18 SRH chamber pressure
mid-range select
SRB separation command flag
LB rate APU A turbine speed LOS
RH rate APU A turbine speed LOS
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Total load factor
Command flag
Confirm flag
Engine 3 command accept
Engine 1 command accept
Engine 2 command accept
ET separation command flag
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Actual time,
G.m.t.
213:13:51:58.44
213:13:51:59.39
213:13:52:00.17
213:13:56:21.02
213:13:56:21.46
213:13:56:41.44
213: 13:56: 41. 53
213:13:56:41.65
213:13:56:48.011
213:13:56:52.00
213:13:56:52.01
213:13:56:52.02
213:13:57:11.84
213:13:57:11.85
213:13:57:11.86
213:13:57:38
213:13:57:39.52
213:13:57:39.53
213:13:57:39.54
213:13:57:46.88
213:13:57:46.89
213:13:57:46.90
213:13:58:47.25
213:13:58:48.09
213:13:58:50.29
213:13:58:50.31
213:13:58:53
213:13:58:53.49
213:13:58:53.49
213:14:04:18.24
213:14:04:18.26
213: 14:·04: 18.26
213:14:04:19.1
213:14:05:16
213:14:05:17
213:14:05:17.41
213:14:05:17.42
213:14:05:17.42
213:14:05:35
,,~,
,,-""', TABLE I.- STS-46 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Continued)
Event
OMS-1 ignition
OMS-1 cutoff
APU deactivation
OMS-2 igni tion
OMS-2 cutoff
Payload bay door open
EURECA release
OMS-3 ignition
OMS-3 cutoff
OMS-4 ignition
OMS-4 cutoff
TSS deploy
TSS retrieve
OMS-5 igni tion
Description
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Right engine bi-prop valve
posi tion
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
posi tion
PLBD right open 1
PLBD left open 1
Voice call
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
posi tion
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Leftight engine bi-prop valve
posi tion
Voice call
Voice call
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
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Actual time,
G.m.t.
Not performed -
direct insertion
trajectory flown
213:14:12:15.17
213:14:12:16.73
213:14:12:17.63
213: 14: 38: 11. 4
213:14:38:11.6
213:14:41:54.4
213:14:41:54.6
213:15:34:00
213:15:35:19
215:07:07
216:10:54:13.3
216:10:54:13.3
216:10:55:23.0
216:10:55:23.0
216:11:39:21.8
216:11:39:21.8
216:11:40:32.2
216:11:40:32.4
217:22:50:47
218:22:52:47
219:09:39:06.6
219:09:39:06.6
TABLE I.- STS-46 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (Concluded)
Event
OMS-5 cutoff
OMS-6 ignition
OMS-6 cutoff
Flight control
system checkout
APU start
APU stop
Payload bay door close
APU activation
for entry
Deorbit maneuver
igni tion
Deorbit maneuver
cutoff
Entry interface
(400K)
Blackout ends
Terminal. area
energy management
Main landing gear
contact
Main landing gear
weight on wheels
Nose landing gear
contact
Nose landing gear
weight on wheels
Vheels stop
APU deactivation
Description
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
PLBD left close 1
PLBD right close 1
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Current orbital altitude
above reference ellipsoid
Data locked at high sample
rate
Major mode change (305)
LB HLG tire pressure
RB MLG tire pressure
LB.MLG weight on wheels
RB MLG weight on wheels
NLG tire pressure
NLG VT on Vheels -1
Velocity with respect to
runway
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
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Actual time,
G.m.t.
219:09:39:40.6
219:09:39:40.6
219:10:23:14.8
219:10:23:14.9
219:10:23:51.2
219:10:23:51.4
220:10:13:00.25
220:10:17:51.95
221:09:33:59
221:09:35:52
221:12:12:26.50
221:12:29:58.51
221:12:29:59.46
221:12:17:09.9
221:12:17:10.0
221:12:19:13.4
221:12:19:13.7
221:12:39:53
No blackout
221:13:05:22
221:13:11:50
221:13:11:50
221:13:11:51
221:13:11:51
221:13:12:05
221:13:12:05
221:13:12:56
221: 13:26: 11.05
221: 13:26: 11.89
221:13:26:13.31
Rullber Title
TABLE II.- STS-46 PROBLEM TRACKING LIST
Reference Co_nts
)
N
\0
STS-46-V-01 IMain Engine 3 Hydrogen
Flow Control Pressure
Anomaly
STS-46-V-02 la) Body Flap Lower Skin
Temperature Transducer
Erratic (V09T1026A)
b) Right Main Landing Gear
Temperature Dropped
Off-Scale Low
(V58T0192A)
STS-46-V-03 IFlight Deck Speaker
Inoperable
STS-46-V-04 IAvionics Bay 2A Smoke
Detector Negative
Excursions
STS-46-V-05 IG02 Manifold PressureDecay
STS-46-V-06 IFan Separator 1 stalled
213:13:58 G.a.t.
IM46RF01
IPR TB~002
213:21:00 G.a.t.
IM46RF02
IPR-TBJ)-0010
221:13:12 G•••t.
214:12:30 G.a.t.
PR COM-4-13-0124
214:20:32 G.a.t.
IM46RF03
213:14:10 G••• t.
IM46RF06
PR MPS-4-13-0928
216:05:23 G.a.t.
IM46RF04
Between lift-off plus 90 and 110 seconds, main engine 3 gaseous
hydrogen outlet pressure (V41P1360A) exhibited erratic pressure
fluctuations up to 70 psi above the baseline pressure of 3100 psia.
Simultaneously, the gaseous hydrogen disconnect pressure IV41P1490A)
dropped 20 psia. A troubleshooting plan was developed and has been in
work since August 14. A chit was not required. No leaks were detected
on the runway. An X-ray of FCV 3 was not definitive. The vendor
removed the poppet/sleeve assembly and no visible contamination was
found.
The body flap skin temperature transducer (V09T1026A) exhibited erratic
temperature drops. The measurement went off-scale low (-200 OF)
several times.
At JIIllin landing gear touchdown, the right main gear brake line return
temperature (V58T0192A) dropped off-seale-low. Although not currently
being used, this sensor can·be used as one of several temperature
control sensors for activation of the system 1 hydraulic circulation
pump.
The flight deck speaker was reported to be inoperable. This is the
first flight of this particular unit and first use of the newly
designed speaker on OV-104. The circuit breaker was cycled five times
without success.
KSC: Removed and replaced unit on 8/13 and shipped to JSC for
troubleshooting.
Smoke concen~ration sensor V62G0608A exhibited several sporadic drops
to -700 pg;m •
KSC: Perform self-test on unit prior to vehicle going to palmdale.
A chit is not reguired.
The gaseous oxygen disconnect pressure (V41P1590A) decayed to zero
within a minute of MPS dump termination. The gaseous oxygen manifold
pressure should decay slowly throughout the flight. Instead, its
pressure tracked that of the liguid oxygen manifold. This performance
failed File IX requirement DV41AYO.210. With a successful dump and
vacuum inert, this problem did not impact the flight.
Troubleshooting plan which includes normal OMRSD tests was developed
and has been in work since August 14. A chit was not required. No
audible leaks were detected on the runway. CV20 failed its leak test
and has been removed for failure analysis.
stall currents were observed on fan separator 1. Fan separator 1 was
restarted and the flooding was cleared at 216:06:49 G.m.t. At
216:07:45 G.m.t., stall currents were again observed. IFM was run and
fan separator 1 cleared, but stalled again after some usage. The
second attempt to run IFM was unsuccessful in regaining normal
operations. No definitive data to show flooding or I118Chanical failure.
KSC: WCS has been removed and will be sent to JSC for
troubleshooting.
RllJlber Title
TABLE U.- STS-46 PROBLEM TRACltIg; LIST
Reference Co_nts
STS-46-V-01 la) Audio Interface unit C 1216:13:20 G.m.t.
Channel I railure rIAR BrCE 029-r062
a) Crew reported that they could receive transmissions from theCI
portion of the audio interface unit (AIU) over their CRU, but wete
unable to transmit on channel I of the AIO. Several CRU's would not
transm.t to channell of the AIU.
b) AIU-D Performance was
Intermittent
STS-46-V-08 Iwccs CRU Low Battery Beep
Tone
STS-46-V-09 IRight OMS GN2 PressureValve Indica~es Open
DR 88230301
215:15:19 G.m.t.
DR 88230291
211:03:52 G•••t.
IM 46Rr05
IPR ~0007
b) The crew reported during the crew debriefing that performance of the
D AIU was intermittent.
The crew was able to operate the CRU's for up to 30 hours after
receiving the initial "low battery" beep tone. The units have been
removed and will be sent to JSC for troubleshooting.
The right OMS pressure valve indicator suddenly showed open at
211:03:52:09 G•••t. Crew verified switch in closed position. The
valve was cycled and the correct position indication returned. A
troubleshooting plan has been developed. A chit was not required.
The valve has been cycled 10 times with nominal results.
ltSC: The valve will be removed and replaced for failure analysis.
w
o
STS-46-V-IO IOVer-modulation of KU-BandI211:03:00 G.m.t.
Channel 3 IPR TBD'I-0005
STS-46-V-l1 IManifold 5 Left RCS valvesI221:13:35 G.m.t.
railed to Cycle IPR TBD'I-0013
All payload ca.-ras can cause the over-modulation condition which
results in loss of channel 2 (OPS recorder dumps) and channel 1
(real-time data). A test matrix was developed to gather on-orbit data
for troubleshooting. A troubleshooting plan has been developed and
work began on August 19. A chit was not required.
During the nomnal postlanding redundant circuit verifications, the
left RCS manifold 5 valves failed to close when the crew cycled the
switch. The RPC power indication was received. The valves operated
nominally when cycled by the ground crew during the OMS/RCS safing.
The valves will be cycled for additional troubleshooting.
)
STS-46-V-12 IADTA 1 and 3 Temperature
Differential during rcs
Checkout
220:10:24 G.m.t.
IPR TBD'I-0018
While in OPS 8 for FCS checkout, a 4.50 C temperature difference was
indicated between the ADTA I and 3 temperature measurements. These
teBp8ratures normally track Bach closer and a difference of greater
than 50 C would violate Lee GNC-75. This Lee utilizes these
measurements as an indication of the health of the analog to digital
converter, which also processes pressure measurements.
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